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The Case for Forgiveness in Legal 
Disputes 
Eileen Barker* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 Although the notion of forgiveness may seem far afield from the 
world of law, forgiveness is a powerful and important tool for conflict reso-
lution.  Litigants need legal solutions, but they also need peace, healing, and 
closure.  Forgiveness provides a vehicle for achieving all of these.1 
 In an effort to win, well-meaning litigators sometimes counsel their 
client against forgiveness.  In one incident, a woman was seeking compensa-
tion for serious medical injuries, but wanted to forgive the person responsi-
ble.2  She was dismayed when her attorney told her: “Don’t forgive.  It will 
hurt your case.”3  While trying to achieve a legal victory and protect his cli-
ent’s economic interests, the lawyer ignored his client’s other interests, such 
as being at peace with what had happened to her and having compassion to-
wards the person responsible for her injuries. 
The lawyer’s aversion to forgiveness was likely based on the unspoken 
dictates of an adversarial legal culture, which forces parties to exaggerate 
their differences.  The legal system focuses on blame and denial, causing 
people to become even more polarized, distrustful, and angry than they were 
 
* Eileen Barker is a commercial and divorce mediator based in San Rafael, California.  She has 
taught mediation, negotiation, and conflict resolution at UC Berkeley School of Law, UC Hastings 
College of Law, Sonoma State University, John F. Kennedy Jr. University, and Werner Institute, 
Creighton University.  She leads trainings on forgiveness and transforming conflict through for-
giveness.  She provides forgiveness coaching to individuals and groups, and is the author of The 
Forgiveness Workbook. 
This article was written with the assistance of Nicole Diaz, a litigator in Los Angeles, California.  
Ms. Diaz graduated from Harvard Law School cum laude, and served as a district court clerk in the 
Central District of California.  She contributed substantially to the research and editing of this arti-
cle, and in drafting Section III, which addresses how forgiveness relates to the lawyer’s ethical du-
ties. 
 1. While the subject of forgiveness has deep roots in many religious traditions, this article 
focuses on the secular use and practice of forgiveness. 
 2. The client in this story reported the incident to me.  Throughout this article, the names of 
those involved in the case studies reported are omitted to safeguard confidentiality. 
 3. Id. 
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when they started.  In doing so, it generally overlooks the tremendous suffer-
ing that litigants often experience.  Instead, the legal system attempts to 
monetize pain and suffering based on the greatest legal fiction of all: that 
money can restore wholeness.4 
Forgiveness has the potential to introduce an element of humanity and 
healing that has been absent from the legal field.5  This is vital when many in 
society hold cynicism and mistrust towards the legal system, and many law-
yers report great dissatisfaction with their jobs, wishing for careers more in 
line with their values.6  By recognizing the larger issues implicated by con-
flict, lawyers have the opportunity to restore dignity and leadership to the 
legal profession.  While litigation often amounts to little more than expen-
sive gamesmanship, forgiveness provides an avenue of dispute resolution 
that can be both practical and transformative.  It offers the parties the chance 
to be made whole beyond a judgment or monetary compensation. 
 In the face of conflict, forgiveness can be a powerful and empower-
ing choice.  As Gandhi said: “The weak can never forgive.  Forgiveness is 
an attribute of the strong.”7  Forgiving doesn’t mean an injured person must 
 
 4. See generally Margaret Jane Radin, Compensation and Commensurability, 43 DUKE L.J. 
56 (1993). 
 5. With the introduction of mediation in civil litigation in the past twenty years, there has 
been increased awareness of the importance of addressing human needs in the service of achieving 
resolution, but only up to a point.  Most lawyers prefer to focus on the legal and monetary issues.  
The predominance of lawyers amongst the ranks of mediators, particularly in legal disputes, rein-
forces this predilection.  The interpersonal dimension of legal disputes, including the role of emo-
tions, is often unaddressed.  This is not entirely surprising since legal education does not generally 
include courses on the dynamics of conflict, emotional intelligence, or interpersonal skills required 
to address conflict on a human level.  While there has been increasing recognition of the importance 
of training lawyers in alternative dispute resolution, see, e.g., U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Best 
Law Schools: Dispute Resolution, Ranked in 2012, available at http://grad-
schools.usnews.rankingsandreviews.com/best-graduate-schools/top-law-schools/dispute-resolution-
rankings, litigation remains the primary focus of legal education. 
 6. Many report that they went to law school based on a desire to make a difference in the 
world.  Kim J. Wright, What Were Your Dreams About Being a Lawyer?, available at 
http://cuttingedgelaw.com/content/what-were-your-dreams-about-being-lawyer.  Yet many lawyers 
end up doing work that is “not aligned with their values. . . .  There is nothing sustainable about 
spending the majority of your working hours feeling that you are not contributing to the world you 
want to live in.”  JANELLE ORSI, SHARING LAW: THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE OF THE NEW ECONOMY 
(ABA Books) (2012). 
 7. “Interview to the Press” (in Karachi about the execution of Bhagat Singh (Mar. 23, 1931)), 
in Young India (Apr. 2, 1931), reprinted in COLLECTED WORKS OF MAHATMA GANDHI ONLINE 
VOL. 51, available at http://www.gandhiserve.org/cwmg/VOL051.PDF (last visited Dec. 17, 2012).  
Gandhi begins by making a statement on his failure “to bring about the commutation of the death 
sentence of Bhagat Singh and his friends.”  He is asked two questions.  First: “Do you not think it 
impolitic to forgive a government which has been guilty of a thousand murders?”  Gandhi replies: “I 
do not know a single instance where forgiveness has been found so wanting as to be impolitic.”  In a 
follow up question, Gandhi is asked: “But no country has ever shown such forgiveness as India is 
showing to Britain?”  Gandhi replies: “That does not affect my reply. What is true of individuals is 
2
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condone what happened.  Nor does it mean that he forgets what occurred.  
Rather, forgiveness is a decision to accept what cannot be changed, while 
changing the one thing that is within one’s control: one’s own story.  At its 
essence, forgiveness is a decision to create a new story about what occurred.  
It is a means of releasing the past, empowering oneself, and moving for-
ward.8 
This article offers an overview of forgiveness.  It is my hope that, with 
education and understanding, lawyers and mediators9 will be better able to 
support clients in the area of forgiveness.  It begins by discussing two types 
of forgiveness relevant to legal disputes: (1) bilateral forgiveness, in which 
forgiveness is exchanged for an apology or other act of remorse, and (2) uni-
lateral forgiveness, in which forgiveness is undertaken by one party alone.  It 
then examines common misconceptions about forgiveness, reasons for re-
sistance to forgiveness, and how forgiveness relates to a lawyer’s ethical ob-
ligations.  Finally, it provides suggestions for how lawyers and mediators 
can add forgiveness to the menu of options available for their clients. 
II. UNDERSTANDING FORGIVENESS 
The essence of forgiveness is the giving up of resentment, anger, and 
hatred.10  Kenneth Cloke, a pioneer in championing forgiveness in media-
tion, emphasizes that forgiveness is a process and a way to release the pain 
of the past: 
 
true of nations. One cannot forgive too much. The weak can never forgive. Forgiveness is the attrib-
ute of the strong.” 
 8. EILEEN BARKER, THE FORGIVENESS WORKBOOK 14 (2009). 
 9. The term mediator, as used throughout this article, is used broadly to include all conflict 
resolution professions such as conflict coaches, ombudsmen, facilitators, and the like. 
 10. See, e.g., WEBSTERS II NEW WORLD COLLEGE DICTIONARY (Houghton Mifflin Harcourt 
2005) (“To forgive is to renounce anger or resentment.”); AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL 
ASSOCIATION, FORGIVENESS:  A SAMPLING OF RESEARCH RESULTS (2006) (“Forgiveness is a pro-
cess (or the result of a process) that involves a change in emotion and attitude regarding an offend-
er.”).  Most experts reject the traditional dictionary definition insofar as it requires one to pardon 
their offender and give up all claims.  See, e.g., Oxford English Dictionary.  Cf. ROBERT ENRIGHT & 
RICHARD FITZGIBBONS, HELPING CLIENTS FORGIVE 29 (American Psychological Association 2000) 
(“People, upon rationally determining that they been unfairly treated, forgive when they willfully 
abandon resentment and related responses (to which they have a right), and endeavor to respond to 
the wrongdoer based on the moral principle of beneficence, which may include compassion, uncon-
ditional worth, generosity, and moral love (to which the wrongdoer, by nature of the hurtful act or 
acts, has no right.”)). 
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Forgiveness is not only a result, but a process of letting go of the 
past and opening to the future, of reclaiming energy from people 
and events we do not need in our lives, and of accepting ourselves 
more fully.  It is a way of releasing ourselves from the past, from 
the burden of our own false expectations, and from the pain we have 
experienced at the hands of others.  It is a release from judgment, 
including our judgments of ourselves.11 
Notwithstanding the benefits of forgiving, experts caution against a me-
diator, or any third person, telling the parties that they should forgive.12  
Cloke writes that “[t]he ability to dispense, but also withhold, forgiveness is 
an ennobling capacity and part of the dignity to be reclaimed by those who 
survive the wrongdoing.”13  Thus, the narrow path a mediator or lawyer must 
skillfully navigate is to explore the possibility of forgiveness with clients, 
when appropriate, while fully honoring forgiveness as a matter of personal 
decision:14 
Forgiveness always is a choice, one the client is free to try or to re-
ject.  There should never be subtle pressure on the client to forgive.  
At the same time, however, some clients blanch at the idea of for-
giveness at first but then change their minds.  The person’s first 
pronouncement about forgiveness is not necessarily the last.15 
A.  Two Kinds of Forgiveness 
In considering the role of forgiveness in legal disputes, it is helpful to 
distinguish between two of the primary approaches to forgiveness: bilateral 
forgiveness and unilateral forgiveness.16 
 
 11. KENNETH CLOKE, MEDIATING DANGEROUSLY 94 (Jossey-Bass 2001). 
 12. See id. at 87 (“It is difficult and dangerous for a mediator, or anyone outside a conflict, to 
suggest to those inside it that they should forgive what was done to them.  The mediator may be 
thought to be advocating capitulation or surrender, or favoring the other side.  It is possible, howev-
er, to approach the possibility of forgiveness subtly, powerfully, and steadfastly. . . .”). 
 13. MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS 17 (Beacon Press 1998). 
 14. CHRISTOPHER MOORE, THE MEDIATION PROCESS 341 (Jossey-Bass 2003) (Consideration 
of forgiveness may be raised by the mediator, but he or she can only open the door; the parties much 
choose to walk through it; pushing forgiveness or reconciliation when parties do not desire it violates 
one of the basic tenets of mediation: that the parties define and set their own goals.). 
 15. ENRIGHT & FITZGIBBONS, supra note 10, at 25.  See also Everett L. Worthington, Jr., 27 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1721, 1730 (2000) (“Unrestrained forgiveness . . . is giving a gift of grace not 
purchased by apology, repentance, and restitution—though such actions might occur.”). 
 16.  A third approach holds forgiveness ultimately to be unnecessary.  This is based on the 
idea that the need for forgiveness arises from the human tendency to judge people and events as right 
or wrong, good or bad.  If instead, we can accept life as it is, then there is nothing to forgive.  See, 
e.g., BYRON KATIE, LOVING WHAT IS (2002); COLIN TIPPING, RADICAL FORGIVENESS: A 
REVOLUTIONARY FIVE-STAGE PROCESS TO HEAL RELATIONSHIPS, LET GO OF ANGER AND BLAME, 
FIND PEACE IN ANY SITUATION (2007). 
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B. Bilateral Forgiveness17 
Bilateral forgiveness occurs when one person forgives another in ex-
change for an apology or other act of contrition.  There is, at least implicitly, 
a quid pro quo: “If you apologize and show sufficient remorse, I will forgive 
you.”18 
The importance of bilateral forgiveness is readily seen when there is to 
be a future relationship between the parties.  Indeed, it is often described as a 
prerequisite for reconciliation.19  But even if there is to be no future relation-
ship, the benefits of bilateral forgiveness should not be overlooked.  An 
apology offers a “restoration of moral balance—more specifically, a restora-
tion of an equality of regard”20 that is potentially healing for all concerned.21 
As the following case study illustrates, bilateral forgiveness has its place 
in litigation, and mediation can provide the ideal conduit for its emergence.  
This case involved two parties litigating an employment contract.  The em-
ployer resented the employee for abandoning him before the contract ended, 
while the employee resented the ensuing lawsuit.22 
A well-established architect hired a junior architect just out of 
school, who was seeking apprenticeship.  They signed a two-year 
contract.  The two architects initially got along very well, but after 
approximately six months the junior architect gave two weeks’ no-
 
 17. Bilateral forgiveness is also sometimes termed conditional forgiveness.  See, e.g., TRUDY 
GOVIER, FORGIVENESS AND REVENGE viii (2002); MOORE, supra note 14, at 342. 
 18. Many experts have identified the elements of an effective apology.  However, most make 
clear that a formulaic approach is not helpful and that an apology can do more harm than good if it is 
not perceived as genuine.  E.g., AARON LAZARE, ON APOLOGY (2004); MOORE, supra note 15 at 
335; Jennifer Brown, The Role of Apology in Negotiation, 87 MARQ. L. REV. 665 (2004); Carl 
Schneider, What It Means to Be Sorry: The Power of Apology in Mediation, 17 CONFLICT RESOL. 
QUARTERLY, no. 3, 265 (2000). 
 19. CLOKE, supra note 11, at 105; Apology/Forgiveness, Conflict Research Consortium, Uni-
versity of Colorado, www.colorado.edu/conflict/peace/treatment/amnesty.htm (last visited Dec. 30, 
2012). 
 20. Lee Taft, Apology Subverted: The Commodification of Apology, 109 YALE L.J. 1135, 
1137–38 (2000) (“The offender demonstrates regard in his willingness to apologize, and the offend-
ed reflects regard when he chooses to forgive.  In law this is a process that would often occur be-
tween strangers, so I do not envision that the restoration of regard would necessarily lead to a close 
interpersonal relationship.  Rather, I envision a process in which the offender and the offended 
would each see and embrace the other’s humanity and would recognize that each occupies a place in 
the wider circle we call life.”). 
 21. Id. at 1137–38. 
 22. This case was reported to me by attorney and mediator Robert Berlin. 
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tice that he was leaving.  The senior architect sued for breach of 
contract, claiming lost profits of over $500,000. 
Although both parties were very upset, they agreed to attend media-
tion with their attorneys.  At the start of the mediation, the senior 
architect claimed he had lost the opportunity to build his firm and 
open a second office as he had hoped.  The junior architect was an-
gry about having to defend himself in an expensive lawsuit.  He said 
he felt forced to leave after observing certain practices that he be-
lieved to be unethical. 
Guided by the mediator, the junior architect was able to understand 
and empathize with the betrayal felt by the senior architect.  Even-
tually, the junior architect offered an apology to the senior architect, 
acknowledging that he could have handled his departure better.  The 
senior architect responded with his own apology.  He disclosed for 
the first time that he had suffered a number of difficult personal 
losses within a short time of the junior architect’s departure, includ-
ing serious family illnesses and a divorce. 
As the parties forgave each other, there were no dry eyes in the 
room.  After further consultation with their lawyers, they quickly ar-
rived at a settlement and parted ways amicably. 
In the above case, mutual forgiveness flowed from reciprocal apologies.  
By addressing the human as well as the legal dimension of the conflict, the 
mediator helped the parties find understanding and empathy, which opened 
the door to an exchange of apologies.  The parties benefited from having at-
torneys who encouraged their clients to do what felt right and were willing 
to show their own humanity.23 
Mediation, owing to the confidentiality of the process, provides an ideal 
forum for the type of honest dialogue that can lead to apology and for-
giveness.24  Attorneys might assume that because clients are in litigation, 
there is no possibility of deeper resolution.  Opportunities for apology and 
forgiveness can easily be missed if the attorneys treat mediation as a mere 
 
 23. Id.  Attorneys sometimes feel challenged by their own emotional responses, having been 
indoctrinated to believe that any show of emotion is unprofessional.  See, e.g., DOUGLAS HARPER 
AND HELENE M. LAWSON, THE CULTURAL STUDY OF WORK 361–62 (2003); JENNIFER L. PIERCE, 
GENDER TRIALS: EMOTIONAL LIVES IN CONTEMPORARY LAW FIRMS (1995); JAN E. STETS AND 
JONATHAN H. TURNER, HANDBOOK OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF EMOTIONS 598 (2007) (four-step model 
used to help doctors normalize and effectively manage their emotions). 
 24. Despite the evidentiary rules barring admission of statements made in mediation, attorneys 
continue to fear that apologies will be exploited during litigation.  One proposed solution is apology 
legislation that allows individuals and institutions to offer an apology without fear of legal liability.  
For discussion, see Jonathan R. Cohen, Legislating Apology: The Pros and Cons, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 
819 (2002).  Such laws have been adopted in many jurisdictions and have proven successful in re-
ducing claims in the medical malpractice field.  E.g., Benjamin Ho and Elaine Liu, Does Sorry 
Work? The Impact of Apology Laws on Medical Malpractice, JOHNSON SCHOOL RESEARCH PAPER 
SERIES NO. 04-2011 (Dec. 2010). 
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formality, assume an overly aggressive or defensive posture, or prevent their 
clients from interacting with each other. 
As seen from the above case study, bilateral forgiveness can be very 
powerful in helping parties reach a settlement in litigated cases.  Still, there 
are times when bilateral forgiveness during litigation is neither desirable nor 
possible, such as when: 
x The offender25 is not remorseful, not willing to apologize, or not able 
to demonstrate genuine regret; 
x The offended person does not wish to have any contact with the of-
fender; 
x The offender is either unavailable or no longer alive; or 
x One or both lawyers obstruct any meaningful exchange between the 
parties. 
Indeed, a major drawback of bilateral forgiveness is the power it gives 
to the offender.  If the offender is not remorseful, refuses to apologize, or is 
unavailable, bilateral forgiveness is not an option.  This is often a source of 
frustration to the offended person, leading to private statements such as “if 
they had only said they were sorry, I might have dropped the case.”26  This is 
where the broader applicability of unilateral forgiveness can come into play. 
C. Unilateral Forgiveness 
Unilateral forgiveness is forgiveness undertaken solely for one’s own 
benefit.27  Participation of the offender is not required.  There are no prereq-
uisites or conditions.28  Unilateral forgiveness enables those who have expe-
rienced injury to free themselves of anger, blame, and resentment—
whenever they are ready to do so.  They are not forced to wait for an apolo-
gy that may not be forthcoming.  They are not forced to continue being vic-
timized by someone else’s conduct or by past events.  And, they do not need 
to make themselves vulnerable to the other side—a particular concern when 
 
 25. Terms like “offended” and “offender” are relative and, as applied to any particular situa-
tion, judgment-laden.  Typically, each person feels that he or she is the offended person, and that the 
other person is seen as the offender.  These terms are used here simply for ease of description. 
 26. See infra note 74. 
 27. CLOKE, supra note 11, at 94; DR. FRED LUSKIN, FORGIVE FOR GOOD: A PROVEN 
PRESCRIPTION FOR HEALTH AND HAPPINESS, vii (2003). 
 28. BARKER, supra note 8, at 14–16. 
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the other side is perceived to be hostile or dangerous.29  Thus, unilateral for-
giveness is a powerful tool that enables parties to gain release, regardless of 
what the other person does. 
According to Fred Luskin, the founder and director of the Stanford For-
giveness Project, unilateral forgiveness is a skill that can be learned with 
measurable and lasting benefits.30  He points out that one of the universal 
causes of suffering is identification of oneself as a victim.31  He teaches a 
cognitive forgiveness process that enables an injured or offended person to 
change his story, shifting this identification so that he no longer sees himself 
as powerless:32 
Forgiveness involves undoing the part of a grievance that casts you 
solidly as a victim.  You grow attached to telling others how cruel 
the betrayal was.  You would tell that story to anyone within ear-
shot.  What’s missing from the story is any desire to learn from the 
incident and move on with your life.  Forgiveness teaches us to 
change the story so we tell it from the point of view of moving on in 
a way that helps us learn and grow.33 
If we are to fully understand forgiveness, we must clearly understand 
what it is not.  According to Luskin: 
 
 29. Some writers caution against the danger of forgiveness in continuing relationships that 
may be harmful, such as those marked by domestic violence.  See e.g., Lisa G. Lerman, Mediation of 
Wife Abuse Cases: The Adverse Impact of Informal Dispute Resolution on Women, 7 HARV. 
WOMEN’S L.J. 57 (1983) (arguing mediation is not appropriate where domestic violence exists).  
Others maintain that forgiveness is appropriate, but should be deferred until the injured person’s 
“basic physical and security needs are met.”  ELLEN WALDMAN & DR. FREDERIC LUSKIN, 
UNFORGIVEN: ANGER AND FORGIVENESS 436 (2006). 
 30. In several studies, Luskin worked with Catholic and Protestant mothers from Northern 
Ireland whose sons were murdered in the political violence.  After taking forgiveness training, the 
women reported feeling less angry, less hurt, less stressed, more optimistic, more forgiving, more 
compassionate, more self-confident, and more vital, and the benefits were shown to continue over 
time.  LUSKIN, supra note 27, at 94–101. 
 31. The two other universal causes are taking offensive conduct personally and blaming the 
offender for one’s feelings.  FREDERIC LUSKIN & DANA CURTIS, Forgiveness, CALIFORNIA 
LAWYER, Dec. 2000, at 24. 
 32. While forgiveness is a distinct process, the focus on creating a new story has strong links 
to narrative psychology and narrative mediation.  See, e.g., JOHN WINSLADE & GERALD MONK, 
NARRATIVE MEDIATION: A NEW APPROACH TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION (2000).  Forgiveness also 
overlaps with transformative mediation insofar as it involves empowerment (forgiving is an empow-
ered and a self-empowering move for the forgiver and can be empowering for the forgiven person as 
well) and recognition (apology is certainly based on recognition).  See, e.g., ROBERT A. BARUCH 
BUSH &JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION: THE TRANSFORMATIVE APPROACH TO 
CONFLICT (1994).  However, the term “transformative” is intended more broadly when used in con-
nection with forgiveness.  It means that the experience of a conflict can be fundamentally changed 
from something that was seen as a problem and obstacle into something that is understood as a pro-
found opportunity for healing and growth. 
 33. LUSKIN & CURTIS, supra note 31, at 24. 
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x Forgiveness is not condoning unkindness; 
x Forgiveness is not forgetting that something painful happened; 
x Forgiveness is not excusing poor behavior; and 
x Forgiveness does not mean reconciling with the offender.34 
D. Reasons to Forgive or Not Forgive 
 Over the past twenty years, substantial scientific research has estab-
lished that forgiveness is immensely beneficial to one’s health and wellbe-
ing.35 Studies show that even thinking about an unresolved conflict causes 
the body to release damaging stress chemicals, triggers feelings of anger, in-
creases resentment, and increases one’s heart rate and blood pressure.36  
People who carry resentment and grudges are at higher risk for heart attacks, 
cardiovascular disease, high blood pressure, decreased lung function, muscle 
tension, stress, and depression.37 
 Forgiveness has been shown to ameliorate all these conditions.  For-
giveness has been shown to reduce anger, hurt, depression and stress.38  At 
the same time, forgiveness has resulted in greater feelings of optimism, 
hope, compassion, and self-confidence.39  Significantly, forgiveness is one 
of two life practices that have been shown to consistently lead to happiness, 
with the other being gratitude.40 
Despite these well-documented benefits, people often resist forgiveness.  
Sometimes this is due to habit, stubbornness, and identification with suffer-
ing and victimhood. “There is great beauty and power in forgiveness, yet 
there is also great resistance to pursuing it,” as Cloke writes.  “It often ap-
pears easier to remain stuck in a conflict than to give up our victim status, 
forgo our view of the other side as evil, surrender our most precious com-
plaints, and forgive the person whose actions or behavior caused the pain.”41 
A common argument is that the seriousness of an offense renders it un-
forgivable.  However, experts point out that in any situation said to be un-
 
 34. LUSKIN, supra note 27, at viii, 73–76. 
 35. Id. at 77–93. 
 36. Id. at 78–80. 
 37. Id. at 78–81. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 77–79. 
 40. MARTIN E.P. SELIGMAN, AUTHENTIC HAPPINESS: USING THE NEW POSITIVE 
PSYCHOLOGY TO REALIZE YOUR POTENTIAL FOR LASTING FULFILLMENT (2003). 
 41. CLOKE, supra note 11, at 90–91. 
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forgivable, one can always find someone who has forgiven.42  Considering 
that people have forgiven the killing of innocent school children, acts of ter-
rorism, the holocaust, and apartheid (to name a few), 43 it is difficult to argue 
that any offense is unforgivable per se. 44  Rather, “like revenge, forgiveness 
is possible in every conflict, no matter how painful or serious.”45 
E. Timing of Forgiveness in Legal Disputes 
Forgiveness is possible at any stage of a dispute.  Consider the case of a 
seventy-five-year-old patriarch who was struck and killed by a vehicle while 
walking near his home:46 
The driver, apparently distracted, had lost control of his car and 
driven on to the sidewalk, striking the man.  It was a clear case of 
negligence.  Before their father’s funeral, his adult children went to 
the home of the driver.  They told him they realized he did not in-
tend to kill their father and that it had been an accident.  They for-
gave him and asked him to forgive himself.  They assured him they 
did not intend to take legal action against him or press criminal 
charges.  They said they needed to grieve their loss, but they did not 
want guilt over their father’s death to contribute to any unhappiness 
in the driver’s life. 
In this case, forgiveness occurred at any early stage and obviated the 
need for legal proceedings.  Yet it would be a mistake to conclude that peo-
 
 42. LUSKIN, supra note 27, at 107. 
 43. An Amish community stunned the world in 2007 by immediately forgiving a man who 
killed many of their children.  See, e.g., DONALD KRAYBILL, ET AL., AMISH GRACE: HOW 
FORGIVENESS TRANSCENDED TRAGEDY (2010); Joseph Shapiro, Amish Forgive School Shooter, 
Struggle with Grief, NPR (Oct. 2, 2007), 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=14900930; The Power of Forgiveness (Jour-
ney Films 2007).  A group of Americans traveling in India forgave the terrorists who attacked them 
and killed two members of their party.  CHARLES CANNON, FORGIVING THE UNFORGIVABLE: THE 
TRUE STORY OF HOW SURVIVORS OF THE MUMBAI TERRORIST ATTACK ANSWERED HATRED WITH 
COMPASSION: THE POWER OF HOLISTIC LIVING (2011).  A victim of Josef Mengele’s horrific human 
experiments at Auschwitz forgave Mengele and the Nazis.  CANDLES HOLOCAUST MUSEUM, 
http://www.candlesholocaustmuseum.org/ (last visited Dec. 31, 2012); FORGIVING DR. MENGELE 
(Select Books Inc. 2006).  See SIMON WIESENTHAL, THE SUNFLOWER (1998) (discussing for-
giveness of the Nazis).  Nelson Mandela forgave after being harshly imprisoned for twenty-seven 
years by the apartheid government and then, when he came to power, instituted the Truth and Rec-
onciliation Commission in order to promote truth telling, forgiveness and healing, rather than pro-
moting retribution with war tribunals.  See generally NELSON MANDELA, LONG WALK TO 
FREEDOM: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF NELSON MANDELA (1995); see also DESMOND TUTU, NO 
FUTURE WITHOUT FORGIVENESS (1999). 
 44. According to Luskin, people often claim an offense is not forgivable in order to hide the 
fact that they are not motivated to forgive.  LUSKIN, supra note 27, at 106–07. 
 45. CLOKE, supra note 11, at 87. 
 46.  CURTIS & LUSKIN, supra note 31, at 23. 
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ple who forgive will automatically drop their legal claims or lose the motiva-
tion to litigate.47 That may happen in some cases, but forgiveness does not 
automatically negate accountability or require the release of the party’s 
claims, rights, or defenses.48  Lawsuits can still be prosecuted and defended.  
Rights can still be vindicated, and in some cases, more effectively. 
Forgiveness can render litigants more effective because less energy is 
wasted on angry tirades and irrational demands.49  “We have all encountered 
people whose anger has become a force more powerful than their own self-
interest or capacity to control it.”50  Forgiveness can help litigants achieve a 
more realistic and less emotional view of the case.  A litigant who lets go of 
anger and other negative emotions is a higher functioning client, a client 
who can be more effective in participating in litigation strategy and prepara-
tion as well as in settlement negotiations.51 
Forgiveness can be particularly useful when parties are preparing for 
mediation.52  Several years ago, two business partners came to me for media-
tion of their partnership dissolution, but the hostility between them was so 
great, they could scarcely be in the same room.  When one of them threw a 
document across the room, I told them candidly that they were not good 
candidates for mediation.  Yet they very much wanted to avoid litigation.  
They asked if there was anything I could suggest.  In response, I asked if 
they would consider doing forgiveness work.  They agreed to this, and each 
completed a series of individual forgiveness coaching sessions.  After the 
sessions, they were able to sit in the same room and speak civilly to each 
 
 47. See infra note 79. 
 48. LUSKIN, supra note 27, at 75. 
 49. Unilateral forgiveness can also help flush out cases based primarily on emotional vendettas 
that do not belong in the legal system in the first place, and help smooth the way for early settlement.  
Peter H. Huang & Ho-Mou Wu Emotional Responses in Litigation, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 31 
(1992) (anger and pride tend to obstruct settlement and increase the number of cases brought to tri-
al). 
 50. CLOKE, supra note 11, at 89.  The legal culture seems to expect poor behavior from clients 
and tolerates conduct from clients and sometimes from lawyers, that we would not even accept from 
three year olds.  See generally, Jonathan Cohen, Advising Clients to Apologize, 72 S. CAL. L.REV. 
1009, 1010 (1998–1999) (“How different are the ways we counsel children and adults to act when 
they have injured others”). 
 51. PAULINE TESSLER, COLLABORATIVE LAW: ACHIEVING EFFECTIVE RESOLUTION IN 
DIVORCE WITHOUT LITIGATION 80 (2001). 
 52. Some mediators and conflict coaches choose to meet parties separately, prior to any joint 
meeting, to help them prepare for mediation.  See, e.g., CINNIE NOBEL, CONFLICT MANAGEMENT 
COACHING: THE CINERGYTM MODEL 190 (2012).  This preparatory work can include forgiveness. 
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other.  The relationship continued to be strained, but they were able to medi-
ate and successfully resolve the partnership dissolution. 
In another case, a probate matter, only one of the parties pursued for-
giveness work, yet it still benefitted the mediation.  The case involved a man 
who provided care to a terminally ill friend for many years.  After the friend 
died, the caregiver was sued for undue influence.  He had been embroiled in 
litigation for over two years, and was very angry and stressed.  His lawyer 
recommended that he seek help.  The caregiver contacted me, saying that he 
wanted to work on forgiveness before attending a court-sponsored settlement 
conference; the case went as follows:53 
At our first meeting, the caregiver told me that he had been devoted 
to his terminally ill friend for several years.  In the lawsuit, he was 
accused of having exercised undue influence to persuade his friend 
to sign a new will that left him a portion of his estate.  The plain-
tiff—a life-long friend of the deceased man—was also a benefi-
ciary; and as a result of the new will, the plaintiff would receive 
substantially less.  Therefore, he was seeking to invalidate the new 
will. 
There had been a prior mediation and prior efforts to settle the law-
suit, but to no avail.  The plaintiff was adamant that the caregiver 
receive nothing from the estate.  The caregiver told me he was will-
ing to take less, as a compromise to end the lawsuit, but he was not 
willing to walk away with nothing. 
The caregiver insisted he had in no way pressured the dying friend 
to change his will.  He believed the friend created the new will to 
repay the caregiver for his tireless and selfless service.  He was tor-
mented by the plaintiff’s accusations maligning his integrity, the vi-
ciousness of the plaintiff’s attack, and the plaintiff’s uncompromis-
ing stance.  He felt powerless, and was dreading the mediation. 
The caregiver told me his goal was to forgive the plaintiff because, 
no matter what happened with the lawsuit, he needed to find inner 
peace.  He committed to undertaking a forgiveness coaching pro-
gram with me, which he successfully completed.  Throughout, he 
continued to work with his attorney, preparing for mediation and 
possible trial.  By the end of our sessions, he felt as though a great 
weight had been lifted from him.  He reported that he had found 
peace with the situation, no matter what the eventual outcome. 
The caregiver was right: he was powerless over what the plaintiff would 
do and whether the plaintiff would be open to compromise at the mediation.  
Yet he had control over his response to the situation, and he had the wisdom 
to recognize this.  He was fortunate to have an attorney who encouraged him 
 
 53. This case study is taken from my forgiveness coaching practice. 
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to release his anger.  In the end, he was able to use unilateral forgiveness to 
bring the litigation to a satisfying conclusion.54 
Clients can also benefit from using forgiveness at the end of a lawsuit to 
achieve closure.55  As discussed above, without emotional healing and for-
giveness, even when a case is settled in mediation, parties are often left with 
more hostility and mistrust than when they began.56  If the parties continue 
to tell the story of how they were wronged, think or speak negatively about 
each other, or carry feelings of anger or resentment, the conflict lives on.  
Forgiveness enables the participants to change the story, learn and grow 
from what has occurred, and achieve peace.57  In this way, forgiveness ena-
bles the conflict to be fully resolved. 
F. Case Types Suitable for Forgiveness 
It is a mistake to believe that forgiveness is only relevant to a select few 
cases.  Forgiveness can be applied in virtually any dispute.  There are obvi-
ous advantages when a significant personal relationship is at stake—
including those involving spouses, siblings, parents, children, neighbors, 
colleagues, co-workers, and business partners—which is not a small catego-
ry of litigated disputes. 58  Forgiveness is also indicated in any dispute in 
which intense emotions are triggered, which once again can cover a large 
range of disputes.  Even when litigation ostensibly revolves around an im-
personal business transaction, key parties—including as corporate execu-
 
 54. About a month later, the caregiver reported that back that the mediation had gone well.  
For the first time the plaintiff was willing to compromise.  The caregiver received approximately 
seventy-five percent of what the will provided.  He was happy with the result, but equally important 
to him, this meant the lawsuit was over and he could move forward in his life. 
 55. MOORE, supra note 14, at 341. 
 56. These are cases where, even after reaching agreement, the parties refuse to be in the same 
room to sign the settlement agreement, or even shake hands. 
 57. See CLOKE, supra note 11, at 107. 
 58. Kathryn Bradley, Knowing Law’s Limits: Comments on “Forgiveness Integral to Close 
Relationships and Inimicable to Justice?,” 16 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 322, 322 (2009); Frank Fin-
cham, Forgiveness Integral to Close Relationships and Inimicable to Justice?, 16 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y 
& L. 357, 374 (2009) (discussing how commitment and closeness significantly helps the process of 
forgiveness).  In my own practice, forgiveness has proven effective in employment disputes, person-
al injury cases, breach of contract cases, probate and trust litigation, sibling disputes, partnership 
disputes, and divorce. 
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tives and managers—may well harbor strong feelings by virtue of being 
forced to bring or defend legal claims. 59 
Furthermore, forgiveness works equally well for plaintiffs and defend-
ants.  For plaintiffs, it is an opportunity to accept the injury or loss that has 
occurred, and to reclaim their wholeness regardless of the outcome of their 
legal claims.  In the following case, for example, the plaintiff forgave the 
other driver for the injuries she had suffered:60 
A plaintiff was injured in a car accident in which the defendant was 
clearly at fault.  During the discovery phase of the litigation, the de-
fendant’s insurance company told the plaintiff’s attorney that the 
defendant had no assets above and beyond the policy limits. 
The plaintiff eventually said she would consider a settlement of the 
case for the policy limits plus a $1000 payment from the driver.  
But first she wanted to meet the defendant face to face, with lawyers 
for both sides present, so that she could tell the driver how the acci-
dent had impacted her life. 
Defendant’s attorney advised him against the meeting.  Yet the de-
fendant was herself an attorney-mediator, insisted that it go forward, 
and later commented: “As an attorney, I realized that this was a rare 
opportunity in a litigation process—the chance to talk with the other 
side—that is almost unheard of.” 
The meeting took place in the office of the defendant’s insurance at-
torney about six months after the lawsuit was filed.  The plaintiff 
tearfully spoke about her ongoing injuries, pain, and difficulties.  
She said that she did not want to take away the defendant’s dreams 
by demanding a larger payment, and that she forgave her. 
In response, the defendant made it clear to the plaintiff that she 
heard what the plaintiff said about her injuries.  She said she was 
very sorry for what happened that day, emphasizing that it had not 
been her intention to cause harm to anyone, and thanked the plain-
tiff for forgiving her.  Further, she expressed how grateful she was 
for the opportunity to meet, so that they both could find some clo-
sure to this unfortunate matter. 
The plaintiff then agreed to the proposed settlement.  After the re-
lease was signed, the defendant went over to the plaintiff and shook 
her hand.  She promised, “I will pray for you every day,” and re-
ports that she continues to do so.  The insurance lawyer said that in 
over thirty years of practice, he had never seen this kind of meeting. 
 
 59. A prevalent legal fiction is that commercial litigation is not emotional.  Most mediators 
would beg to differ.  See, e.g., Kenneth Cloke, Building Bridges Between Psychology and Conflict 
Resolution (2008) http://www.mediate.com//articles/cloke7.cfm.  Cloke writes that all conflict is 
emotional by definition.  Id. (“It is possible for people to disagree with each other without experienc-
ing conflict.  What distinguishes conflict from disagreement is the presence of what are commonly 
referred to as ‘negative’ emotions, such as anger, fear, guilt, and shame.  Thus, every conflict, by 
definition, contains an indispensible emotional element.” (emphasis in original)). 
 60. This case study was reported to me by attorney and mediator Nancy Milton. 
14
Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal, Vol. 13, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol13/iss1/7
[Vol. 13: 205, 2013]  
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL 
219 
Several aspects of this case are striking.  Parties in insurance cases usu-
ally do not meet in mediation; insurance representatives attend mediation, 
but the actual defendant does not.61  What occurred here was possible only 
because the parties, in this case, both took charge and insisted on the face-to-
face meeting over the objections of the lawyers.  In addition, this case dis-
pels the widely held belief that face-to-face exchanges are unimportant when 
the parties have no past relationship and will have no future relationship. 
In another case, involving an employment discrimination claim, the de-
fendant initiated the forgiveness process: 
In the mediation of an employment discrimination case, the plain-
tiff, a young woman, claimed that her former employer discriminat-
ed against her because of a disability.  Before mediation, the law-
yers for both sides told the mediator a joint session would be a 
waste of time and so the mediation started with private caucuses.  
But during these separate meetings, the owner of the defendant and 
employer company asked to meet with only the plaintiff and the 
mediator, without lawyers present.  With the lawyers’ consent, the 
mediator met with the two parties and learned that the parties had 
been close friends.  The owner had acted as the young woman’s 
mentor, and was angry and disappointed that she filed a lawsuit 
against the company.  He wanted to better understand her reasons 
for filing the suit.  The employee recounted company actions that 
seemed hostile and unfair, and talked about the hurt she had suf-
fered.  The owner said he understood her reasons, and was no long-
er angry that she had filed the suit.  They apologized to each other 
and then returned to their separate rooms.  Settlement discussions 
resumed with the lawyers taking the lead.  After a few rounds of 
caucusing, the parties reached an impasse.  The parties asked to 
meet with each other again, with only the mediator.  This time, 
within about fifteen minutes, the parties found a number they could 
both live with, subject to approval of their lawyers.  The plaintiff’s 
lawyer felt the settlement was too low and the defendant’s lawyer 
felt it was too high.  But they saw their clients hugging and laugh-
ing, and turned their attention to writing up the agreement for their 
clients to sign.62 
Arguably, the plaintiff could have pushed for more money, and the de-
fendant could have insisted on less.  But the value of restoring the relation-
ship offset the extra dollars.  The clients ended up feeling happy and satis-
fied, which reflected well on the lawyers. 
 
 61. I have been told by knowledgeable attorneys that insurance companies routinely instruct 
the insured party not to have any communication with the other side. 
 62. This case study was taken from a case I mediated. 
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III. FORGIVENESS AND THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT FRAMEWORK 
Some might question whether counseling clients on forgiveness is con-
sistent with an attorney’s role as a zealous advocate.  But zealous advocacy 
is not synonymous with combative, win-at-all-costs litigation.  Rather, it re-
quires the attorney to act in a client’s best interests, which might well in-
clude things like peace, dignity, and maintaining long-term relationships.  As 
will be shown in this section, counseling clients about forgiveness in appro-
priate cases is fully consistent with a lawyer’s role and ethical duties. 
A. Zealous Advocacy 
Zealous advocacy is often said to be “the fundamental principle” of 
lawyering.63  However, the exact meaning of this term has been the subject 
of debate.  The Model Code of Professional Responsibility makes clear that 
zealous advocacy requires an attorney to identify and promote a client’s best 
interests.64  Equally clear, a client’s “best interests” are not limited to narrow 
legal concerns.65  “In rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law 
but to other considerations such as moral, economic, social, and political 
factors that may be relevant to the client’s situation.”66  Thus, zealous advo-
cacy naturally encompasses forgiveness as an option for clients when cir-
cumstances warrant it. 
The Model Rules recognize that in addition to legal or monetary con-
cerns, a client may have other important interests.67  To properly assess the 
 
 63. GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAYWERING: A 
HANDBOOK ON THE RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 17 (suppl. 1998); see also Jonathan R. 
Cohen, Culture of Legal Denial, 84 NEB. L. REV. 247, 251 n. 6 (2005) (citing MONROE H. 
FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, ZEALOUS REPRESENTATION: THE PERVASIVE ETHIC, UNDERSTANDING 
LAWYER’S ETHICs 71 (2004) (“This ethic of zeal . . . established in Abraham Lincoln’s day . . . con-
tinues today to be . . . the dominant standard for lawyerly excellence.”). 
 64. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7–9 (1983) (lawyer’s commitment is to act 
in his client’s best interests). 
 65.  MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY R. 2.1 (“In rendering advice, a lawyer may re-
fer not only to law but to other considerations such as moral, economic, social, and political factors 
that may be relevant to the client’s situation.”). 
 66. Id.  See also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.1, cmt. 2 (“Advice couched in nar-
row legal terms may be of little value to a client, especially where practical considerations, such as 
cost or effects on other people, are predominant.  Purely technical legal advice, therefore, can some-
times be inadequate. It is proper for a lawyer to refer to relevant moral and ethical considerations in 
giving advice.”); see also MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7–8 (“Advice of a lawyer to 
the client need not be confined to purely legal considerations.  A lawyer should advise the client of 
the possible effect of each legal alternative.  A lawyer should bring to bear upon this decision-
making process the fullness of his experience as well as his objective viewpoint.”). 
 67. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.1 and comments. 
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full range of issues at stake, it is appropriate for a lawyer to consider the 
broader context of the dispute, including the relationships involved and the 
impact of litigation on the client’s life.  A lawyer may well observe that even 
though a client could win at trial, the client is better off in the long-term by 
seeking reconciliation with the other side.  Or the lawyer might see that a 
client would benefit from unilateral forgiveness, particularly if anger, re-
sentment, or sorrow were impeding the client’s progress and wellbeing.  Ul-
timately, a zealous advocate might counsel a client about forgiveness for the 
simple reason that it would benefit his client.  To include forgiveness as an 
option in client counseling is consistent with zealous advocacy, but admit-
tedly outside the current practice of most lawyers.  It is particularly at odds 
with the brand of scorched-earth, hardball litigation that has become preva-
lent in recent years.68  In that model, lawyers are fighters and every lawsuit 
is viewed as a battle to be won at all costs.69  Because litigation is seen as a 
zero sum game, hardball litigators condone and even encourage antagonism 
with the other side.70  They actively avoid delving into the human or ethical 
aspects of the dispute, because these are viewed as irrelevant.  Even if a cli-
ent expresses a desire to forgive, they likely would advise against it, fearing 
that the other side might view it as a sign of weakness.71 
 
 68. This hyper-aggressive style of litigation is sometimes referred to as “Rambo” lawyering.  
See Robert N. Sayler, Rambo Litigation: Why Hardball Tactics Don’t Work, A.B.A. J. 79 (1988).  
Sayler identifies six characteristics of Rambo litigation, including: (1) “[a] mindset that litigation is 
war”; (2) “[a] conviction that it is invariably in your interest to make life miserable for your oppo-
nent”; (3) “[a] disdain for common courtesy and civility”; (4) “[a] wondrous facility for manipulat-
ing facts and engaging in revisionist history”; (5) “[a] hair-trigger willingness to fire off unnecessary 
motions and to use discovery for intimidation rather than fact-finding”; and (6) “[a]n urge to put the 
trial lawyer on center stage rather than the client or his cause.” 
 69. Joseph Ortega & Lindsay Maleson, Incivility: An Insult to the Professional and the Profes-
sion, 37 A.B.A. 1 (Spring 2008).  “Rambo” lawyering includes mindset that litigation is war, in your 
interests to make life miserable for opponent, disdain for courtesy and civility, facility for manipulat-
ing facts, unnecessary motions and discovery, put trial lawyer on center stage.  Id. at 2–4. 
 70. See Craig Enoch, Incivility in the Legal System? Maybe It’s the Rules, 47 SMU L. REV. 
199, 203 (1994) (“Rambo lawyers are accused of employing sharp practices, offensive or excessive 
gamesmanship, uncivil litigation maneuvers, and hardball tactics.”). 
 71.  See Cohen, supra note 63, at 265.  Cohen discusses how the “advocacy bias” inherent in 
Rambo-style lawyering reduces a lawyer’s entire role to a partisan combatant in litigation.  This ig-
nores the role of lawyers as counselors and leads to  “denial-based collusion” between the lawyer 
and the client, where the lawyer actively avoids learning any facts that might be at odds with the 
lawyer’s chosen narrative for the case.   Id. at 261.  An example of this denial-based culture is seen 
when insurance companies routinely counsel motorists not to apologize if they get into an accident.  
Id. at 257 (citing Cohen, supra note 50, at 1012–12 n. 9). 
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Although hardball litigators claim to be operating in the service of zeal-
ous advocacy,72 zealous advocacy does not require hyper-aggressive, com-
bative behavior.73  Hardball lawyers distort the concept of zealous advocacy 
by assuming adversarial battle is always in their client’s best interest.74  This 
naturally leads to a single mode of action: pursue victory at all costs, regard-
less of the consequences to either party.  However, litigation is not always in 
a client’s best interest, taking into consideration the impact of the battle on a 
client’s physical, emotional, and psychological well-being.  Even if a full-
court press ultimately obtains a legal victory, the price paid may be irrepara-
ble harm to long-term relationships, impaired physical health, emotional ex-
haustion, and missed opportunities for deeper healing.75 
Attorneys sometimes attempt to justify hardball tactics on the grounds 
that this is what clients want.  And indeed, clients often do insist on a hard-
fought legal battle—at first.  However, as Integrative Law Institute founder 
Pauline Tessler76 eloquently writes, this is an important juncture for client 
counseling: 
 
 72. See Allen K. Harris, The Professionalism Crisis—The ‘Z’ Words and Other Rambo Tac-
tics: The Conference of Chief Justices’ Solution, 53 S.C. L. REV. 549, 569 (2002) (“The phrase 
‘zealous advocacy’ is frequently invoked to defend unprofessional behavior and a ‘Rambo,’ or ‘win 
at all costs,’ attitude.”); Jean M. Cary, Rambo Depositions: Controlling an Ethical Cancer in Civil 
Litigation, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 561, 579 (1996) (“Rambo lawyers claim that their obligation to 
zealously advocate for their clients justifies their behavior.”). 
 73. The fiduciary duty that a lawyer owes her client arguably includes the duty to consider 
alternatives to aggressive litigation.  See, e.g., Charity Scott, Doctors as Advocates, Lawyers as 
Healers, 29 HAMLINE J. PUB. L & POL’Y 331, 353 (2008) (“referring to an attorney as a ‘fiduciary’ 
more fully captures the range of her professional and ethical obligations today than calling her a 
‘zealous advocate.’”)  This is consistent with the brand of zealous advocacy suggested here, which 
emphasizes the client’s ultimate interests beyond the legal battle, and above the attorney’s own in-
terest in litigating or even winning.  See Fred C. Zacharias, Pre-employment Ethical Role of Law-
yers: Are Lawyers Really Fiduciaries, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 569, 605–06, 607–08 (2007) 
(“Common law defining fiduciary duties limits the ways in which lawyers may pursue their own 
interests to the detriment of clients . . . .  Fiduciary law requires a lawyer to place the interests of his 
client above the attorney’s own interests . . . .”). 
 74. See Cohen, supra note 63, at 265 (lawyers often wrongly assume that the client’s only in-
terests are financial, failing to address other interests such as psychological ones). 
 75.  Many clients may be waiting for an apology, consciously or not.  In a survey of members 
of the State Bar of Georgia, eighty-three percent of respondents agreed that apology alone could set-
tle many disputes.  See Erin Ann O’Hara & Douglas Yarn, On Apology and Conscience, 77 WASH. 
L. REV. 1125 n.14 (2002) (citing Douglas Yarn, Survey of Lawyers’ Attitudes Toward ADR, con-
ducted on behalf of the Georgia Supreme Court’s Commissions on Dispute Resolution and Profes-
sionalism (on file with author)).  In an experiment conducted by Russell Korobkin and Chris Guth-
rie, tenants were more likely to accept a settlement offer from their landlord when it was 
accompanied by an apology.  Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychological Barriers to Litiga-
tion Settlement: An Experimental Approach, 93 MICH. L. REV. 107, 148 (1994). 
 76. Tessler also co-founded the International Academy of Collaborative Professionals. 
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Many . . . lawyers find themselves vulnerable to the appeal of cli-
ents who want them to jump on a white horse and attack the other 
party, who is seen as embodying all evil, just as the client embodies 
all good.  In that mode of black-and-white adversarial practice, at-
tention is rarely given to advising clients fully about the hidden 
emotional, relational and financial costs involved in legal battle, nor 
is much time typically spent advising clients about the growing 
spectrum of low-conflict dispute-resolution choices available to cli-
ents.77 
Counseling clients about the dangers of the client’s preferred legal strat-
egy is nothing new.  A lawyer often serves as a “gatekeeper,” preventing the 
client from pursuing legal strategies that would ultimately cause them 
harm.78  Even if a client insists that they want war, a good lawyer will con-
sider whether a hostile legal battle will actually benefit the client in the long 
run.  She will take time at the beginning of the engagement to identify the 
client’s various needs and interests and, having identified those interests, 
have the courage to counsel the client on all available options, including the 
possibility of forgiveness when appropriate.79 
B.  Counselors at Law 
A more expansive consideration of client interests naturally heralds a 
broader understanding of a lawyer’s role in conflict resolution.80  As a law-
yer’s purview widens to encompass the client’s underlying needs and inter-
ests, the lawyer’s role shifts to become more human and less technical.81  
 
 77. TESSLER, supra note 51, at 81. 
 78. Fred Zacharias, Lawyers as Gatekeepers, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1387, 1389–90, 1405 
(2004) (discussing the famous Elihu Root quote that “half of the practice of a decent lawyer consists 
in telling would-be clients that they are damned fools and should stop” and commenting that “Elihu 
Root was an aggressive, ultra-partisan lawyer.  Yet he warned us that the lawyer’s job consists as 
much of standing in the way of misguided client pursuits as of implementing client desires . . . . We 
are gatekeepers, and we should never forget it.”). 
 79. Another source of attorney resistance to forgiveness might be the fear that if clients for-
give, there will be fewer hours of legal services to bill, or that a forgiving client might accept a lower 
settlement resulting in a lower contingent fee for the attorney.  While many lawyers seem to turn a 
blind eye to these sorts of conflicts of interest, the ethical requirements are clear.  A lawyer must put 
the client’s interests ahead of her own.  See e.g., Zacharias, supra note 73, at 607–11 (“Fiduciary law 
requires a lawyer to place the interests of his client above the attorney’s own interests . . . .”). 
 80. Lawyers have traditionally worn many hats including those of advisor, advocate, negotia-
tor and evaluator.  See e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, pmbl. (2010). 
 81. Lawyers who avoid any discussion of the emotional aspects of the case, tend to “mask” 
their own humanity and create a formal distance between themselves and their clients.  See Jonathan 
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Rather than simply functioning as gladiators-at-law, lawyers have an oppor-
tunity to serve as counselors-at-law and conflict resolution specialists.82  A 
counselor-at-law might view her ultimate goal as healing conflict, rather 
than just winning legal disputes.83  Because healing is not a zero-sum game, 
the counselor may be more willing to explore cooperative or conciliatory le-
gal strategies.  This broader, more constructive  model of lawyering is gain-
ing popularity, as frustration with hardball lawyering grows.84  Dissatisfac-
tion with the current state of the profession is so acute that many 
commentators have championed a more human, integrated approach to prac-
ticing law not only to better serve clients, but also as a measure of self-
preservation.85 
Still, the suggestion that lawyers assume a broader, more humanistic 
role inevitably raises some objections that can be roughly grouped into two 
categories.  First, critics fear that lawyers who embrace cooperative strate-
 
R. Cohen, When People Are the Means: Negotiating With Respect, 14 GEO. J. OF LEGAL ETHICS 739, 
764 (2011) (discussing how negotiators and lawyers tend to deny humanity in others by “masking” 
them in formal legal roles) (citing JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW: 
CARDOZO, HOLMES, JEFFERSON, AND WYTHE AS MAKERS OF THE MASKS (1976) (arguing that law-
yers frequently impose masks on people to hide their fundamental humanity); see also Walter Otto 
Weyrauch, Law as Mask: Legal Ritual and Relevance, 66 CAL. L. REV. 699 (1978)).  Zealous advo-
cacy is arguably enhanced when lawyers can relate to their clients, opposing counsel, and judges as a 
real person rather than as a disembodied advocate. 
 82. There is a large field of study that encompasses conflict, conflict theory, and the dynamics 
of conflict, including causes of escalation and de-escalation.  See, e.g., BERNARD MAYER, THE 
DYNAMICS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION (2000); DEAN PRUITT, JEFFREY RUBIN, & SUNG HEE KIM, 
SOCIAL CONFLICT, ESCALATION, STALEMATE AND SETTLEMENT (2003).  This body of work would 
seem highly relevant to the practice of law and yet, is inexplicably absent from standard legal educa-
tion.  According to Noam Ebner, Assistant Professor at the Werner Institute for Negotiation and 
Dispute Resolution at Creighton University School of Law, “ADR textbooks have made the material 
accessible and reframed it into legal terms, style and referencing familiar to legal educators and stu-
dents—and still, this has not made it a cornerstone of legal education.”  See JULIE MACFARLANE ET 
AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION: READINGS AND CASE STUDIES (2011); CARRIE J. MENKEL-MEDOW ET 
AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION: BEYOND THE ADVERSARIAL MODEL (2010). 
 83. See STEVEN KEEVA, TRANSFORMING PRACTICES: FINDING JOY AND SATISFACTION IN 
LEGAL LIFE 102 (1999) (“It has often been said that the law is one of the great healing professions, 
that while medicine heals the body and the clergy heals the soul, the law heals societal rifts.”); see 
also Susan Daicoff, Law as a Healing Profession: The “Comprehensive Law Movement,” 6 PEPP. 
DISP. RESOL. L.J. 1 (2006); MARJORIE A. SILVER, THE AFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL: 
PRACTICING LAW AS A HEALING PROFESSION (2007). 
 84. The move away from Rambo-style advocacy has spawned a variety of alternative legal 
models centered on a more humane approach to solving conflict.  See generally Susan Daicoff, Law 
as a Healing Profession: The “Comprehensive Law Movement,” 6 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 1 (2006); 
Charity Scott, Doctors as Advocates, Lawyers as Healers, 29 HAMLINE J. OF PUB. L. & POL’Y 331, 
362–63 (2008). 
 85. See, e.g,  STEVEN KEEVA, supra note 83 (discussing lawyers who found satisfaction by 
transforming practices); HOWARD GARDNER ET AL., GOOD WORK: WHEN EXCELLENCE AND ETHICS 
MEET (2001) (emphasizing importance of ethics to job satisfaction). 
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gies will place clients at a disadvantage vis-a-vis clients with combative 
lawyers.  Second, critics object that lawyers are not trained to act as counse-
lors or address extra-legal aspects of the conflict.  We will address these ob-
jections here, with particular focus on forgiveness. 
C. Strategic Impact of Forgiveness 
Even if lawyers appreciate the idea of forgiveness, they may doubt its 
viability in the real world of adversarial litigation.86  In particular, it is com-
monly assumed that forgiveness (and its cousin, apology) require surrender-
ing negotiating leverage without anything in return.87  Because of this fear, 
some lawyers adhere to the familiar cycle of denial and blame, rather than 
risk cooperative or conciliatory approaches.88 
However, research shows that cooperative strategies that include for-
giveness are not only effective, they are consistently more effective than 
competitive strategies.  This was proven in a now-famous series of game-
theory tournaments based on iterated versions of the Prisoner’s Dilemma.89  
Researchers pitted thousands of different strategies against each other to see 
test which strategy would be the most effective, one based on cooperation, 
one based on competition, or a blend of the two.  The winning strategy was a 
very simple one called Tit for Tat.90  This program always began by cooper-
ating, and then continued to cooperate as long as the opponent cooperated.  
However, if the opponent made a competitive move, then the program 
matched the move, Tit for Tat.  At the same time, the program was forgiv-
 
 86. See Cohen, supra note 67, at 265 (discussing the common error of assuming that a com-
bative style is necessary for effective advocacy). 
 87. Allen K. Harris, Increasing Ethics, Professionalism and Civility: Key to Preserving the 
American Common Law and Adversarial Systems, PROF. LAW 91, 99 (2005) (noting that Rambo-
style advocates wrongly assume that “a lawyer cannot be professional and civil on the one hand 
while being loyal to the client and a strong advocate on the other hand.”). 
 88. E.g., JAY FEINMAN, DELAY, DENY, DEFEND: WHY INSURANCE COMPANIES DON’T PAY 
CLAIMS AND WHAT YOU CAN DO ABOUT IT (Portfolio/Penguin 2010). 
 89. See ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (2006).  In the Prisoner’s Di-
lemma, each player has a choice of either cooperating or competing in each round.  If both players 
cooperate, they do well, and if both players compete they do poorly.  However, the maximum gain to 
a player is realized if, in any round, she competes and the opponent cooperates.  Id. at 78. 
 90.  Id. at 19–20. 
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ing: if the opponent resumed cooperation, it responded in kind, thereby per-
mitting mutual cooperation to be restored.91 
In addition to showing the strategic value of cooperation, the discussion 
above shows how forgiveness can be a central element of a cooperative 
strategy.  The Tit for Tat model demonstrates that cooperative strategies in-
crease negotiating leverage by building trust and understanding between po-
tential adversaries.  This maxim holds true for lawyers.  Research shows 
that, far from being eaten alive, cooperative lawyers are generally perceived 
as more effective advocates than lawyers without those traits.92 
Cooperative strategies are already being successfully employed in the 
legal field.93  For example, in the field of medical malpractice, a number of 
pilot programs have shown the efficacy of early apology in response to med-
ical errors.  One of the first programs mandating full disclosure was adopted 
by the Veteran Affairs Medical Center in Lexington, Virginia in 1987.  In 
the past, the VA in Lexington, Kentucky, like many medical institutions, 
routinely employed a “deny and defend” response to claims of medical error.  
It decided to switch to a practice of taking responsibility, which involved 
admitting fault, apologizing, and offering fair compensation.  After seven 
years, the result was that the VA settled most of the claims and ended up in 
the lowest quarter of Veteran Affair medical centers for malpractice payouts, 
even though it was in the top quarter for the number of tort claims filed.94  
 
 91. Id. at 176–77; see also DOUGLAS R. HOFSTADTER, METAMAGICAL THEMAS (1985) (chap-
ter twenty-five, Prisoner’s Dilemma Computer Tournaments and the Evolution of Cooperation, ad-
dresses this point). 
 92.  While combative lawyering is often glamorized, most lawyers prefer a cooperative style, 
and believe that other lawyers who display those traits are more effective.  See Jonathan R. Cohen, 
When People Are the Means: Negotiating With Respect, 14 GEO. J. OF LEGAL ETHICS 739, 779 
(2011) (Discussing Gerald Williams’s study in which lawyers were asked to assess other lawyers as 
negotiators.  Williams found that sixty-five percent of the assessed lawyers had “cooperative” nego-
tiating styles.  Thirty-eight percent of these lawyers were seen as effective negotiators.  Only twenty-
four percent of the lawyers had “competitive” negotiating styles.  Of these lawyers, only six percent 
were seen as effective.); Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Shattering Negotiation Myths: Empirical Evi-
dence on the Effectiveness of Negotiation Syle, HARV. NEGOT. L. REV.,143 (2002) (Negotiators who 
are assertive and empathetic are perceived as more effective.  Ineffective negotiators are more likely 
to be stubborn, arrogant, and egotistical.  Problem-solving behavior is perceived as highly effective.) 
 93. There has been a significant move towards legal practice in the divorce field.  A model 
called “collaborative law” was developed in the 1980s by Minnesota attorney Stu Webb.  The model 
has continued to evolve and gain traction, and is now espoused by the International Academy of Col-
laborative Professionals and other professional groups. There is a growing parallel movement to 
bring collaborative law into civil practice.  See, e.g., David A. Hoffman, Collaborative Law in the 
World of Business, 6 THE COLLABORATIVE REV. 3 (2003); Sherrie R. Abney, The Evolution of Civil 
Collaborative Law, 15 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 495 (2009). 
 94. DOUG WOJCIESZAK, SORRY WORKS! SPECIAL EDITION: DISCLOSURE APOLOGY AND 
RELATIONSHIPS PREVENT MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS 80 (Google ebook 2008).  It is important 
22
Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal, Vol. 13, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol13/iss1/7
[Vol. 13: 205, 2013]  
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL 
227 
The University of Michigan adopted a similar program in 2001 under which 
patients were given full disclosure and early offers of compensation in re-
sponse to claims of medical error.95  There too, the program resulted in sub-
stantial decrease in claims for compensation (including lawsuits), time to 
claim resolution and liability costs.96 
In the field of general civil suits, the Toro Corporation, a manufacturer 
of lawn care products used to rely on an aggressive “litigate everything” ap-
proach to the 125 annual personal injury claims arising from the use of its 
products.97  In 1991, it switched to a conciliatory approach, mediating cases 
when possible and making fair offers of compensation.98  Following this 
switch, the total cost per claim fell from $115,620 to $30,617.  By 1999, To-
ro had saved over $75 million.  This case study illustrates how a defendant’s 
unilateral decision to acknowledge harm can set the wheels of forgiveness in 
motion, allowing defendants to reduce claims and settle more favorably. 
D. Reluctance to Address Non-Legal Issues 
The other common objections are that lawyers are not trained to offer 
counseling, nor are they qualified to address non-legal issues.99  These ob-
jections conflate two distinct functions: incorporating people skills into the 
practice of law and acting as a psychologist.100 
 
to note that in the field of medical malpractice, doctors and medical institutions have the protection 
of apology legislation.  Arguably, apology legislation should be extended to all disputes. 
 95. See supra note 93. 
 96. Allen Kachalia et al., Liability Claims and Costs Before and After Implementation of a 
Medical Error Disclosure Program, 153 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 213–22; Bhavani S. Reddy, 
Apology and Medical Error Full Disclosure Programs: Is Saying “I’m Sorry” the Answer to Reduc-
ing Hospital Legal Costs? University of Houston Law Center, available at 
http://www.law.uh.edu/healthlaw/perspectives/2006\(BR)ApologiesFinal.pdf. 
 97. Jonathan R. Cohen, Apology and Organizations: Exploring an Example from Medical 
Practice, 27 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 1447, 1460–61 (2000). 
 98. Id. 
 99. The aggressive, hardball litigation model discourages lawyers from grappling with emo-
tional or relational aspects of the dispute, viewing those issues as outside the scope of a lawyer’s 
engagement.  W. Bradley Wendel, Public Values and Professional Responsibility, 75 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 1, 8 (1999) (“Professional responsibility, on this account, is a technocratic value.  It empha-
sizes skill and competence, but also stresses moral distance between lawyer and client.”). 
 100. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.1 cmt. 22 (“It is proper for a lawyer to refer to 
relevant moral and ethical considerations in giving advice.  Although a lawyer is not a moral advisor 
as such, moral and ethical considerations impinge upon most legal questions and may decisively 
influence how the law will be applied.”). 
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If a lawyer is to truly assess a client’s best interests, he would naturally 
consider a range of factors in addition to a legal analysis, including how liti-
gation will impact the client’s wellbeing, and possibly, the client’s views on 
apology and forgiveness. 101  This may require some lawyers to gain new 
skill sets, including training in emotional intelligence and communication.102  
But these skills do not turn a lawyer into a therapist.103  The lawyer’s focus 
remains on conflict resolution, not on psychological diagnosis or processing.  
To discuss forgiveness as one of many dispute resolution options is well 
within the bounds of a lawyer’s role to explore all relevant aspects of the 
dispute, and to consider the impact of those factors in deciding on a legal 
strategy.104  In cases where a client needs additional support for forgiveness, 
the lawyer can refer the client to a qualified forgiveness coach or therapist.105 
Nor does attorney counseling regarding forgiveness interfere with client 
autonomy.106  Ultimately, the lawyer must defer to the client’s objectives.  
Suggesting or even encouraging forgiveness is different than forcing it.  In 
 
 101. See Angela Olivia Burton, Cultivating Ethical, Socially Responsible Lawyer Judgment: 
Introducing the Multiple Lawyering Intelligences Paradigm Into the Clinical Setting, 11 CLIN. L. 
REV. 15 (2004) (discussing the range of skills lawyer employ when counseling clients, including 
logical-mathematical, linguistic, narrative, interpersonal, intrapersonal, categorizing, and strategic); 
see also Carrie J. Menkel-Meadow, When Winning Isn’t Everything: The Lawyer as Problem-Solver, 
28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 905, 912 (2000) (“Legal analysis is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition of 
good problem solving”). 
 102. See, e.g., Peter Reilly, Teaching Law Students How to Feel: Using Negotiations Training 
to Increase Emotional Intelligence, 21 NEGOT. J. 301 (2005); Eileen Barker, Emotional Literacy for 
Mediators (March 2003), available at http://www.mediate.com/articles/ebarker1.cfm; MARSHALL 
ROSENBERG, NONVIOLENT COMMUNICATION (2003); SHARON ELLISON, TAKING THE WAR OUT OF 
OUR WORDS:  THE ART OF POWERFUL NON-DEFENSIVE COMMUNICATION (2002). 
 103. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 63, at 280 (for legal counseling be effective, “addressing the 
client’s emotions to a certain degree is often important, if not essential” and does not constitute ther-
apy).  For cases in which clients agree it would be helpful to address the emotional and psychologi-
cal components of their dispute, another option is for   professionals to work as interdisciplinary 
teams, such as a lawyer and mental health professional.  According to Stephen Sulmeyer, J.D., 
Ph.D., this is already occurring in Marin Superior Court, California, which in 2007 adopted an Inter-
disciplinary Settlement Conference program, and in 2011 an Early Mediation Program, that pair 
lawyers and mental health professionals trained in dispute resolution for family law cases.  Based on 
the success of these programs, Sulmeyer recently founded a group called Integrative Mediation Mar-
in to offer similar interdisciplinary teams for the private mediation of family, elder, probate, em-
ployment, and other cases. 
 104. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.1 and comments. 
 105. Id. (“[I]t is well within the scope of the lawyer’s role to recommend that the client consult 
with mental health experts or other professionals when needed.”).  Comment 4 to the Rule states: 
“Matters that go beyond strictly legal questions may also be in the domain of another profession. . . . 
Where consultation with a professional in another field is itself something a competent lawyer would 
recommend, the lawyer should make such a recommendation.” 
 106. As with any personal counseling, the goal is to have a conversation that helps the client 
understand the ramifications of his choices.  “The choices are fundamentally the client’s.  The law-
yer’s essential role remains that of service.”  Cohen, supra note 63, at 280–81. 
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truth, forgiveness cannot be forced.  Lawyers can point out the ways in 
which continued hostility harms clients physically, emotionally and finan-
cially.107  Lawyers can also encourage their client to consider the many bene-
fits of forgiveness, even if it means giving up some financial gain.  But it 
remains the client’s decision whether or not he wants to forgive or apolo-
gize.  Counseling a client about forgiveness does not change this basic mod-
el; it simply widens the scope of the discussion. 
The adversarial system has been seriously questioned.108  In the past 
twenty-five years, numerous alternatives, including mediation and collabora-
tive law, have come into wide use.109  Clients increasingly understand that a 
great many legal disputes can be resolved without adversarial tactics, includ-
ing cases previously thought to require litigation.  As these shifts take place, 
lawyers will find themselves at a crossroads.  They can be combative litiga-
tors who escalate conflict, or they can be lawyers who excel at constructive 
problem solving and promote long-term resolution.110  For some, this may be 
a welcome change.111  For others, it may well require conscious effort and 
 
 107. Some lawyers avoid these discussions because they are worried that they will alienate their 
clients.  Id. at 269.  While these conversations can be difficult, honesty is often what best serves cli-
ents, even if there is a risk that it alienates some clients and lose revenue for attorney.  Id. at 276–77.  
It is also possible that this candor appeals to clients, and positively distinguishes the lawyer as a 
trusted advisor. 
 108. E.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble with the Adversarial System in a Post-Modern, 
Multicultural World, WM. & MARY L. REV. 5, 5–6, 11 (1996) (“adversary system may no longer be 
the best method” for dealing with legal disputes.  “Binary, oppositional presentations of facts in dis-
pute are not the best way for us to learn the truth; polarized debate distorts the truth, leaves out im-
portant information, simplifies complexity, and obfuscates rather than clarifies . . . .  A culture of 
adversarialism, based on our legal system, has infected a wide variety of social institutions.”). 
 109. Thomas Stipanowich, ADR and the Vanishing Trial, 1 J. OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 843–
912 (2004) (citing “unprecedented efforts to develop strategies aimed at more efficient, less costly, 
and more satisfying resolution of conflict, including more extensive and appropriate use of media-
tion and other “alternative dispute resolution.’”). 
 110.  The Honorable D. Brooks Smith, The Lawyer as Peacemaker, 63 U. PITT. L. REV. 909, 
910, 914 (2002) (“[W]e need to be peacemakers—people who assist others in resolving conflicts 
rather than reflexively following a course that will only add pain to pain. . . .  But you, as lawyers 
who are also peacemakers, can be a genuine moral force. You can bring your judgment to bear on 
helping people to solve their problems. You can be the voice that urges people to come together.”). 
 111. As lawyers seek more constructive and fulfilling approaches to legal practice, there is a 
growing international movement to explore new models of law.  See e.g. SUSAN DAICOFF, 
COMPREHENSIVE LAW PRACTICE: LAW AS A HEALING PROFESSION (2011); Leonard L. Riskin, The 
Contemplative Lawyer: On the Potential Benefits of Mindfulness Meditation to Law Students, Law-
yers, and their Clients, 7 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1 (2002); CENTER FOR CONTEMPLATIVE MIND IN 
SOCIETY, www.contemplativemind.org/programs/law/ (sponsors mindfulness retreats and other pro-
grams for lawyers and law students); CUTTING EDGE LAW, www.cuttingedgelaw.com (calls upon 
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resolve to break away from the familiar patterns of adversarial litigation.  
Either way, change is upon us.  According to Professor Julie McFarlane, 
who has written extensively on dispute resolution and the evolving role of 
lawyers: 
Legal practice is showing signs of the evolution of a new profes-
sional identity for lawyers which is responsive to new dispute reso-
lution processes with an emphasis on just and strategic settle-
ment. . . .  Effective negotiation and settlement skills are becoming 
increasingly central to the practice of law.112 
One lawyer who broke away from the adversarial mold was Mohandas 
Gandhi, who said this about his legal career: 
I had learnt the true practice of law.  I had learnt to find out the bet-
ter side of human nature and to enter men’s hearts.  I realized the 
true function of a lawyer was to unite parties riven asunder.  The 
lesson was so indelibly burnt into me that a large part of my time 
during the twenty years of my practice as a lawyer was occupied in 
bringing about private compromises of hundreds of cases.  I lost 
nothing thereby—not even money, certainly not my soul.113 
IV.  INCORPORATING FORGIVENESS IN PRACTICE 
Ultimately, the biggest obstacle to incorporating forgiveness into the le-
gal field is not the intractability of the other side, the seriousness of the of-
fense, or the limitations of the adversarial system itself.  The true obstacle to 
forgiveness is the lack of professional education and training.114  For profes-
sionals interested in including forgiveness in their practices, here are some 
suggested steps: 
1. Put forgiveness on the menu of topics that might be discussed with 
clients.  By introducing the idea, it gives clients permission to talk 
about forgiveness if and when they are ready.115 
 
lawyers as leaders of social evolution); INTEGRATIVE LAW INSTITUTE, 
www.integrativelawinstitute.com (dedicated to reclaiming law as a healing profession); SHARK FREE 
WATERS, www.sharkfreewaters.com (calling for a conscious and integrative approach to transfor-
mation in law). 
 112. Julie McFarlane, The New Lawyer: Moving from Warrior to Conflict Resolver, ADR 
BULLETIN: Vol. 10: No. 8, Article 5 (2009). 
 113. MOHANDAS K. GANDHI, AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 134 (Mahadev Desai trans., 1993). 
 114. Regarding motivation to forgive, Luskin says the obstacle “is our tendency to continue 
reacting to hurt in ways that do not work.”  LUSKIN, supra note 27, at 108.  On the flip side, motiva-
tion can be found in the fact that forgiveness allows people to regain their power and restore peace of 
mind.  Id. 
 115. After presenting this suggestion at a conference, a colleague reported back to me one year 
later that this single act had made a significant difference in his mediation practice.  He found many 
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2. If a client is very stressed or angry, the lawyer or mediator might talk 
about such topics as healing anger, letting go of grudges, keeping 
things in perspective, and accepting past events that cannot be 
changed.  These are valuable steps for the client, whether or not the 
word “forgiveness” is used. 
3. Be receptive to and supportive of a client’s initiative to forgive.  Un-
derstand the value and benefits of forgiveness. 
4. Encourage honest and open communication between those in con-
flict.  Allow each person to say what he most needs to say in order to 
end the conflict.116 
5. Ask whether there are any circumstances under which the client 
would consider forgiving the other person, or asking to be forgiven, 
for what occurred.117 
6. Even though we are told from childhood that we should forgive, rare-
ly are we taught how to forgive.  When appropriate, refer clients to a 
forgiveness class or qualified forgiveness coach. 
7. The lawyer or mediator might learn about forgiveness and practice 
forgiveness in his own life.  This will take him a long way towards 
being able to guide clients in this area. 
8. Remember that it is not appropriate or helpful to impose a sense of 
obligation or pressure to forgive on another or on one’s self.  Above 
all, forgiveness is a choice.118 
V. CONCLUSION 
In over thirty years of practice as a lawyer and a mediator, I have ob-
served how consuming and debilitating conflict is for most people.  As a lit-
 
more clients stepping up to forgive just by virtue of the fact that he had started mentioning for-
giveness in his introductory remarks. 
 116. Some of the most outstanding mediators have as their central goal helping the parties have 
an honest conversation that enables them to better understand each other.  See, e.g., GARY 
FRIEDMAN & JACK HIMMELSTEIN, CHALLENGING CONFLICT (2009).  They encourage parties to 
identify what they most want or need to hear from the other party, apologize for their role in the con-
flict, acknowledge the other person’s positive intention, clarify what is most difficult for them, and 
acknowledge what they have learned from the situation.  KENNETH CLOKE, CONFLICT REVOLUTION: 
MEDIATING EVIL, WAR, INJUSTICE AND TERRORISM 323 (2008). 
 117. See MOORE, supra note 14, at 341–42 (“[T]he mediator can explore whether there are any 
conditions that might merit consideration for forgiveness to occur.”). 
 118. LUSKIN, supra note 27, at 63 (“[F]orgiveness is a choice.  Neither you nor I have to for-
give anyone who has hurt us.  On the other hand, we can forgive all who have done us harm.  The 
decision is ours to make.”). 
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igator, I saw clients go through years of litigation, only to win victories that 
seemed hollow compared to the time, money, and energy spent in achieving 
them.  As a mediator, I witnessed people settle lawsuits, only to continue 
mistrusting and hating those on the other side.  Above all, I have seen how 
our legal system and our culture glorify adversity and encourage blame and 
retribution.  Rarely do we consider the price we are paying for those atti-
tudes, or the greater possibilities offered by truth, healing, and forgiveness.  
This needs to change.  
It is time for the legal field to expand.  It is time to include forgiveness 
as an option for parties in legal disputes.  This can begin with dialogue about 
the role forgiveness can play in legal disputes.  It can start with lawyers and 
mediators opening their hearts and minds to the idea of forgiveness.  As they 
explore ways to bring forgiveness into conflict resolution, eventually the 
best practices will emerge.  
For lawyers, learning about and practicing forgiveness offers the oppor-
tunity for greater career satisfaction.  It releases lawyers from the limited 
role of single-minded aggressors and defenders, disconnected from their 
own needs and feelings.  It allows them to align their work with their core 
values, and make the difference they want to make in the world.  It enables 
them to render the highest service for their clients, and contribute to bringing 
about a more peaceful society.119 
According to David Link, former Dean of Notre Dame Law School, 
“Lawyers need to know that their clients want peace and harmony in their 
lives, and that they need to facilitate that, rather than exacerbate the prob-
lems.”120  Understanding the value of forgiveness and supporting clients who 
wish to forgive are ways lawyers can help their clients achieve dignity, 
peace, and healing.  In this way, lawyers become heroes.  They become posi-
tive agents for change, as well as peacemakers. 
As far back as 1850, Abraham Lincoln, a preeminent lawyer and 
peacemaker himself, advised lawyers as follows: “Discourage litigation.  
Persuade your neighbors to compromise whenever you can.  Point out to 
them how the nominal winner is often a real loser—in fees, expenses and 
waste of time.  As a peacemaker the lawyer has a superior opportunity to be-
ing a good man.  There will still be business enough.”121 
 
 119. One attorney who has admirably embodied this role is Robert W. Plath, a leader in the 
forgiveness movement.  Plath is the creator of International Forgiveness Day and the founder of the 
Worldwide Forgiveness Alliance, dedicated to evoking the healing power of forgiveness worldwide.  
See WORLDWIDE FORGIVENESS ALLIANCE, www.forgivenessday.org. 
 120. Steven Keeva, Once More, With Healing, A.B.A. J. (May 1, 2004, 4:19 PM), 
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As Gandhi once said about truth and nonviolence, forgiveness is “as old 
as the hills.”  Yet until now, it has scarcely been recognized in the field of 
law.  Whatever the reasons for this, and surely there are many, incorporating 
forgiveness into the resolution of legal disputes is an idea whose time has 
come.  Lawyers and mediators can render an invaluable service by learning 
about forgiveness and guiding clients who want to undertake forgiveness 
work.  Lawyers and mediators who support clients who wish to forgive will 
soon observe that, far from weakening their clients, it strengthens them be-
yond measure, and can restore them to wholeness far beyond a legal victory 
or monetary reward.  This is not to say that forgiveness will be appropriate 
for every case.  It will not.  Nor is it meant to suggest that forgiveness is 
easy.  It is not.  But the potential rewards of forgiveness—for lawyers, for 
clients, and for society—are enormous. 
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